RECENT CASES
refrain from unfair labor practices should not be heard to complain that his rights have
been unfairly curtailed.
In the Ford case, the board's order directed the Ford Company to cease and desist
from "disseminating among its employees statements or propaganda which disparages
or criticizes labor organizations or which advises its employees not to form such organizations." Presumably the board assumed that if unfair labor practices existed in the
recent past, any statement by an employer as to unions is coercive. The employer apparently is even prohibited from revealing in a non-coercive manner facts which, if
known, would persuade the employees not to join a particular union. If this is the correct interpretation, the order would seem to violate the employer's right to freedom of
speech. Once the court has enjoined the employer's unfair labor practices, there may be
a broad area within which the employer can speak without reasonable employees feeling they are being coerced.' 8
Labor Law-Picketing and Strike Arising out of Breach of Contract Not to Deal
with Companies Not in Good Standing with Union-[Washington].-A baking company executed a contract with a union under which it agreed to hire only members in
good standing with the union, and agreed to certain hours of labor and wages. The
contract contained the following clause: "There shall be no goods delivered to or sold
at the plant for resale from trucks to persons not in good standing with local union
No. 524." The baking company continued to sell half of its output of goods to Paddy
Kake Sales Company, which was not in good standing with the union. Regarding these
sales as a breach of contract, the union called a strike and refused to handle any of the
baking company's goods going to Paddy Kake, and picketed the baking company's
place of business. In a suit by the baking company for an injunction and damages, relief was granted by the trial court. Damages and an injunction were denied the defendant union on a cross complaint based on the contract. On appeal, held, the breach
of contract constituted a basis for a labor dispute. Picketing did not constitute a
secondary boycott. The denial of damages for the breach of contract was affirmed.
Marvel Baking Co. v. Teamsters' Union Local No. 524.'
Under Washington statutes2 a breach of contract may be the basis of a labor dispute. "Sef-help"-peaceful picketing3 and striking4--can be used where such action
isCf. dissent of Judge Lehman in Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employee's Union,
281 N.Y. I5O, Y57, 22 N.E. (2d) 320, 322 (1939), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 171, 174 (x939).
1 105 P. (2d) 46 (Wash. 1940).
2 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. I94O) § 7612-13 (the term "labor dispute" includes any controversy covering terms and conditions of employment and their maintenance).
3 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. i94o) § 7612-z4 (e); Safeway Stores v. Retail
Clerks' Union, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372 (1935); United Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 8o F.
(2d) I (C.C.A. 7th I936); Adams v. Building Service Employees' Union, i97 Wash. 242, 84 P.
(2d) 1021 (1938); Fornili v. Auto Mechanics' Union, 200 Wash. 283, 93 P. (2d) 422 (I939);
Yakima v. Gorham, 200 Wash. 564, 94 P. (2d) ISo (i939), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 388
(x939); Kimbel v. Lumber & Saw Mill Workers' Union, I89 Wash. 416, 65 P. (2d) io66 (i937)
(reasonable distance of picketing allowed). See The Status of the Right to Picket in Washington, 5 Wash. L. Rev. 126 (1930); Status of Picketing in Washington, 15 Wash. L. Rev. 47
(i94o), for history of picketing in Washington.
4Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. i94o) § 7612-4 (a) (no court shall issue an
injunction or prohibit persons interested in a labor dispute from "ceasing or refusing to perform
any work or to remain in any relation of employment").
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does not constitute a secondary boycott.s Although the remedies sought for breach of
contracts are traditionally damages or specific performance, union contracts seem to
reserve the right of "self-help" by picketing or strike.6 This reservation apparently
rests on the seriousness of the contractual breach, the relative slowness of the courts in
affording relief,7 and the unsatisfactory character of injunctive relief.8 By its decision
in the principal case the court sanctioned "self-help" by denying both the injunction
sought by the producer and the damages sought by the union in its cross complaint,
thus putting the parties in their original positions.
An employer cannot complain of the strike and picketing which implement a labor
dispute, except where the existence of a secondary boycott affords him relief.9 Courts
in Washington and other jurisdictions have attempted to distinguish kinds of secondary boycotts,o usually speaking in ambiguous terms of pressure and coercion
against third parties." While a primary boycott is one applied directly to the "offending" person,' 2 a secondary boycott is said to exist where pressure is put upon the cuss Barnard and Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 Wash. L. Rev. 137, 146-47
(i94o), and cases cited; Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction 44-45, 174, 39 (i93o).
6 See generally Christenson, Legally Enforceable Interests inAmerican Labor Union Working Agreements, 9 Ind. L. J. 69 (1933); Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts,
48 Yale L. J. 195 (1938); cf. Williams v. Quill, 277 N.Y. i, 12 N.E. (2d) 547 (1938).
7Witmer, op. cit. supra note 6, at 210.
8 A provision of the Washington statutes (Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, i93i )
§ 7612) providing for injunctive relief where it is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to
property is modeled after Section 20 of the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52
(1927)), which was construed in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (254 U.S. 443 (1920))
not to prevent injunctions against stranger picketing. A later provision (Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Remington, Supp. 1940) § 7612-i) prevents issuance of injunctions where a labor dispute is
involved, or where contrary to public policy, augmenting this by the provision (Wash. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1940) § 7612-7) for injunctions in case of irreparable damage as

in the Clayton Act. But Section 7612-7 has been held unconstitutional (Blanchard v. Golden
Age Brewing Co., x88 Wash. 396,411, 63 P. (2d) 397,4o4 (i936); Chin On v. Culinary Workers'
and Soft Drink Dispensers' Union, i95 Wash. 530, 8i P. (2d) 803 (1938)) while Section 7612-I
has been held to afford relief against stranger picketing where no labor dispute exists
(Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., i88 Wash. 396, 412, 63 P. (2d) 397, 404 (1936); Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union, 184 Wash. 322, 51 P. (2d) 372 (1935)).
Cf. Oakes, Organized Labor and Industrial Conflicts 949-72 (1927); Frankfurter and

Greene, op. cit. supra note 5, at 173-75 (1930); Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act
(1930).
9 Note 5 supra.
'o

United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 20o Wash. 474, 490, 93 P. (2d)

772,

220-24

779 (1939);

Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 446 (1920); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 50 (1927); cf. Oakes, op. cit. supra note 8, at
605, 65i (1929).

'Barnard and Graham, op. cit. supra note 5, at i41 (i94o); Gray v. Building Trades
Council, 9i Minn. T71, 97 N.W. 663 (1903); Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103
Pac. 324 (igog); Smythe Neon Sign Co. v. Local Union No. 405, 226 Iowa 1Ir, 284 N.W. 126

(1939).
" Booker and Kinnaird v. Louisville Board of Fire Underwriters, 188 Ky. 771, 781,
(1920); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 46o (1920).
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tomer or supplier in order to cause them to withhold patronage from or goods to the
"offending" person.x3 In the principal case the court held there was no secondary boycott because there had been no harassing or threatening of customers, distinguishing
two earlier Washington cases in which secondary boycotts had been found. In one a
sympathetic strike had been called by the union to force the complaining company's
customers into complying with union demandsr4 and in the other customers of the
complaining company were picketed for handling the company's products.'s
The producer's ability to trade freely is restricted when he signs a contract not to
deal with one not in good standing with a union; in the present case, pressure by the
union to sign the contract is indicated by the fact that the producer faced the loss of
half of his business if the contract was fulfilled. The purpose of such an agreement is to
give the producer's customer the alternative of unionizing or being deprived of business
relations with the producer. Such pressure brought to bear upon a customer, even
though indirect, would seem indicative of a secondary boycott, and the absence of
harassment of or threats against the customer seems not to be a tenable distinction. In
a recent New York case 6 a lower court-although seeking to follow the liberal view of
the Court of Appeals in Goldfinger v. Fedntuch!7-found a secondary boycott in a situation in which no contract was involved but pressure was put upon the customer
through the producer.
If, however, the situation in the instant case is not to be called a secondary boycott,
the fulfillment of a contract which creates the pressure on the customer might be considered unenforceable as against public policy. 8 The contract in the principal case, the
validity of which was not questioned by the Washington court, is not unlike other trade
agreements which have been viewed as restraints of trade and considered invalid x9 The
very purpose of the producer-union contract in the principal case was a restraint. Nor
does the contract seem conceptually different from the "yellow dog" contract, in which
an employee must agree with the employer as a condition of employment not to join or
remain a member of a union. Following the National Labor Relations Acto in which
the "yellow dog" contract was designated an unfair labor practice, Washington, like
other states, enacted a statute declaring a "yellow dog" contract "contrary to public
policy." ! The contract in the principal case restricts the freedom of the employer, who
!3 Ellis v. Journeymen Barbers' Int'l Union, 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N.W. 111 (r922); cf. cases
cited in note ii supra.
14 Pacific Typesetting Co. v. Int'lTypographicalUnion, 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923).
xSUnited Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 P. (2d) 772 (1939).
x6Feldman v. Weiner, z73 Misc. 46x, 446, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 730, 734 (S. Ct. 1940).
17 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937) noted in 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. SI8 (1938). See
8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 356 (1941).
is 5 Williston, Contracts §§ x62 9A- 3 o (rev. ed. 1937). Cf. People v. McFarlin, 43 Misc.
591, 89 N.Y. Supp. 527 (County Ct. 19o4); Oakes, op. cit. supra note 8, at 226-29.
'9 5 Williston, Contracts § 1633, p. 4576 (rev. ed. 1937) ("any bargain or contract which
purports to limit in any way the right of either party to work or do business ....the manner
in which it shall be done ....may be called a bargain or contract in restraint of trade");
Rest., Contracts §§ 513-I5; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, x931) § 2382. See also Jaffe,
Some Comments on the Price Discrimination Act, io U. of Cin. L. Rev. 402, 412 (1936).
20 § 8(3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3) (Supp. 1939).
"1Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 194o) § 7612-2 and 3.
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is amenable to a dosed shop in his own plant, to contract freely in pursuit of his busi22

ness.

The "unity of interest" theory developed by theNewYork courts to avoid the consequences of secondary boycotts by allowing the union to follow the non-union product
and persuade the public not to purchase it,23 may have application in the principal case.
Although no non-union product was involved and the plant picketed supplied the nonunion shop, it might be contended that the plaintiff manufacturer in the principal case
is in "unity of interest" with the non-union Paddy Kake company so that the union
may strike and picket the manufacturer, stopping the sale of union goods to a nonunion shop, thereby causing Paddy Kake to unionize. 2 4 That the plaintiff had an
economic benefit from the sale to the non-union shop is shown by the fact that the shop
purchased fifty per cent of the plaintiff's output.

Labor Law-Picketing User of Non-Union Service-Unity of Interest-[New York].
-A company installed a burglar alarm system in a retail haberdashery, retaining title
in and agreeing to maintain and service the system. In the course of a dispute over
wages and hours between the company and a union representing its employees, the
union picketed the haberdashery, carrying in a peaceful and orderly manner signs
which read, "Maintenance of Burglar Alarm in this store unfair....." Upon complaint of the haberdasher, the pickets were prosecuted for disorderly conduct under
Section 722 of the Penal Code of New York.' Upon appeal from convictions, held,
there was "unity of interest" between the company and the store, thus making the
picketing lawful. Judgments reversed. People v. Midler.'
The term "unity of interest" gained general currency when it was used to describe
the economic relations between the manufacturer and the retailer in Goldfinger v. Fein-It should be noted that the plaintiff in the instant case went bankrupt before the final
determination by the Washington Supreme Court. It is not shown what factors were instrumental in causing this insolvency. Brief for Appellant, at 57, Marvel Baking Co. v. Teamsters'
Union Local No. 524, x05 P. (2d) 46 (Wash. i94o).
23Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, ix N.E. (2d) 910 (1937). See also Aeolian Co.
v. Fischer, 29 F. (2d) 679 (C.C.A. 2d 1928); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering 254 U.S.
443, 479 (r92o); Thornhill v. Alabama, 3io U.S. 88 (I94O); 8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 357 (1941).
24 But cf. Feldman v. Weiner, 173 Misc. 461, 466, i7 N.Y.S. (ad) 730, 734 (S. Ct. 1940)
("the conclusion reached is that defendants' action amounts to a secondary boycott which
does not come within the permissible legal exceptions noted in the Goldfinger case ..... To
hold otherwise would be to hold that a union-shop manufacturer of garments, for example,
could be picketed if any one of his many customers, wholesale or retail, did not have a union
shop.").
xN.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1938) c. 40, § 722. This statute reads in part as follows:
"Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the
peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed
2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere
the offense of disorderly conduct ....
with, obstruct, or be offensive to others.......
'I74 Misc. 872, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) ioo3 (N.Y. City Cts. 194o). The convictions below resulted
in suspended sentences because the labor dispute had been settled. Permission to appeal to the
Court of Appeals has been granted.

